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Chapter 3 
Tax Compliance and the Psychology of 
Justice: Mapping the Field 
Michael Wenzel 
'In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.' 
Benjamin Franklin writing to Jean Baptiste LeRoy, 13 November 1789 
According to this popularised aphorism, taxes are ubiquitous, as they affect 
practically everybody, and surely they are as little in our personal interest as death. 
Yet, while the everyday use of the expression does not occur without a wink, 
science seems to have missed the humour in it. It is certainly true that taxation 
deserves the closest scientific attention, as hardly any other legislation has such a 
widespread impact on our lives, from 'impacting personal decisions to shaping 
economic phenomena, political forces and the institutional fabric of our society' 
(Long and Swingen, 1991, p. 638). Furthermore, the failure to comply with tax 
laws costs states billions of dollars each year, thus impacting severely on their 
provision of government services and their socio-economic functioning (see 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). However, the dominant theoretical paradigm 
that understands tax compliance in terms of individual self-interest, that is, as an 
individual's rational choice aimed at maximising individual outcomes under 
conditions of uncertainty (in the tradition of Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), misses 
important dimensions of the phenomenon. In recent years, a number of researchers 
have pointed to the limited understanding this paradigm provides and delivered 
empirical evidence for the role of 'non-economic' factors in tax compliance (see 
Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; De Juan, Lasheras and Mayo 1994; Reekers, Sanders 
and Roark, 1994; Alm, Sanchez and De Juan, 1995). At the same time, there have 
been attempts to incorporate factors such as equity considerations and moral 
constraints into traditional expected utility theory, as another category of individual 
outcomes to be maximised (see Gordon, 1989; Cowell, 1992; Bordignon, 1993; 
Falkinger, 1995). 
Research so far has referred to non-economic factors in a rather selective 
fashion. A more systematic analysis of these factors seems necessary for further 
progress in the explanation of tax non-compliance. The present chapter focuses on 
justice and fairness considerations that could play a role in taxpayers' evaluations 
of the tax system and therefore in their decision to comply or not comply with tax 
laws. I will offer a conceptual framework for such justice considerations based on 
conceptual distinctions made in social psychological justice research. I will review 
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research on fairness perceptions in the area of taxation as it relates to the suggested 
taxonomy and finally discuss implications of the conceptual framework. 
Specifically, the review will demonstrate the wealth of justice issues potentially 
relevant to tax compliance and the neglect of certain justice perceptions in existing 
research. The taxonomy raises the question of the relative importance of the 
various justice issues for tax compliance as well as the conditions of their 
importance. 
Firstly, however, I will present arguments for the limitations of a purely 
economic self-interest approach to tax compliance. While similar critiques have 
been put forward elsewhere (see Cowell, 1992; Scholz, 1998), my arguments will 
specifically make a case for a consideration of justice issues at different levels of 
analysis. 
Beyond Individual Self-interest: A Multi-level Approach to Tax Evasion 
Traditional economic models of tax evasion (see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) 
regard tax compliance as an outcome-maximising decision between the alternatives 
of: (a) truthfully paying tax which results in a certain loss, and (b) evading tax 
which results, with some uncertainty, in either a reduced loss (in terms of taxes not 
paid) or an even greater loss (due to the fines imposed if the evasion is detected 
and penalised). These early models, however, neglect the fact that taxpayers also 
have their share in government services and public goods that are funded by the tax 
revenue. Taxpayers receive some gains in exchange for the taxes they pay, and not 
only may they consider these outcomes in their rational equation, but they may also 
evaluate whether the exchange is an equitable one or not (Cowell, 1992; Falkinger, 
1995). 
Further, the issue of public goods in return for taxes adds a social dimension to 
the problem, because the amount of revenue available, and the quantity and quality 
of public goods provided, is not solely dependent on the single taxpayer's choice to 
pay or evade taxes. Rather, taxpayers are interdependent, as their outcomes in 
terms of the public goods they share are a function of their combined behavioural 
choices. The issue of tax compliance can therefore be considered a social dilemma 
(see Dawes, 1980). Individual taxpayers may choose to evade tax in order to 
maximise their personal outcomes and still enjoy their share of the public good, 
which is not affected by single defective choices. However, if many taxpayers 
chose to do so, revenue would fall to a level where certain public goods would be 
no longer affordable and everyone's outcomes would be reduced (Weigel, Hessing 
and Elffers, 1987; Elffers, 2000). Models of tax compliance would have to 
incorporate taxpayers' awareness of their mutual interdependence in their rational 
decision of how to maximise individual outcomes. Furthermore, as research on 
social dilemmas informs us (see Pepitone, 1971; Wit, Wilke and Oppewal, 1992; 
van Dijk and Wilke, 1993 ), taxpayers may also evaluate what would be fair for 
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them to contribute to the public good, considering their relative resources and 
relative share of the public good as well as others' level of evasion (Bordignon, 
1993). 
Social psychological research also informs us that social dilemmas assume a 
quality of greater competitiveness and less cooperativeness when the involved 
parties define themselves as members of different groups rather than as individuals 
(see Brewer and Schneider, 1990; Schopler and Insko, 1992). A crucial factor 
contributing to this effect may be the perceived sharedness of and consensus on 
distinctive group interests that give social-normative support for one's tendency to 
act in the interests of one's group (Zander, 1971; Haslam, 2001). Importantly, once 
one identifies with a group, norms and perceived consensus within the group 
should make members act in the interests of their own group, even if they 
personally would not profit from their own behaviour. Most models of tax evasion 
assume that taxpayers are motivated to maximise their individual outcomes; they 
do not consider the possibility that taxpayers define themselves as members of 
social groups and act in terms of the interests and norms of their group and fellow 
group members (Sigala, Burgoyne and Webley, 1999). Again, it also holds for this 
level of analysis that group members are not only concerned about maximising 
their group's outcomes but also about their group receiving the outcomes it is 
perceived to be entitled to, according to ingroup norms of justice and fairness. 
Research on relative deprivation has repeatedly shown that group deprivation is a 
stronger predictor for social protest and resistance than feelings of personal 
deprivation (see Dube and Guimond, 1986; Walker and Mann, 1987; Hafer and 
Olson, 1993). The possibility that tax evasion is an act of social protest against a 
tax system perceived to be unfair to their ingroup needs to be considered. 
Finally, research shows that persons or groups involved in a social dilemma are 
more cooperative and show more concern for collective outcomes when they 
identify themselves in terms of the same inclusive group (Brewer and Schneider, 
1990); for instance, the society including all individuals and all different groups of 
taxpayers. Defining themselves more inclusively, their selves and correspondingly 
their self-interests become so transformed that they include the interests of others 
and of the collective as a whole (Brewer, 1991; Morrison, 1997). A concern for the 
interests, goals and values of the inclusive category has rarely been taken into 
account in research and models on tax evasion (see Taylor, Chapter 4, this volume 
for a departure from general practice). Again, based on a collective self-
identification, taxpayers might feel committed to maximising their collective 
outcomes as well as committed to socially shared and normative representations of 
their collective identity that prescribe certain distributions of burdens and goods as 
appropriate and just. A concern for a fair society rather than for one's personal or 
group interests would then motivate taxpayers. Tax evasion would depend on 
taxpayers' (socially mediated) perceptions of whether the current tax practice is 
either conducive to maximising the collective's welfare or consistent with a 
representation ofhow society should look. 
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To sum up, research on tax evasion has been dominated so far by 
individualistic approaches that focus exclusively on the motivation to maximise 
personal material outcomes. The analysis needs to be extended to also include the 
possibility of taxpayers defining themselves in more inclusive ways, either as 
members of different social groups or, most inclusively, as members of the society 
as a whole, implying a concern for outcomes of their ingroup or the welfare of their 
whole nation, respectively. Furthermore, models of tax evasion need to take into 
account that taxpayers may not only want to maximise their interests, however 
defined, but also desire to see justice and fairness realised (see Kinsey, Grasmick 
and Smith, 1991). In the remainder of this chapter, I will look more closely at 
different justice considerations that may play a role in tax compliance and 
differentiate between an individual, group and inclusive (societal) level of analysis. 
Justice, Fairness and Tax Compliance: A Taxonomy 
Empirical research on tax compliance often refers to issues of justice and fairness 
in a rather undifferentiated and/or selective manner. Given the dominance of the 
rational actor approach, authors interested in issues of justice and fairness seem to 
have found it their main challenge to demonstrate the general importance of these 
perceptions for tax compliance. Justice perceptions have often been either 
operationalised through global measures, or selected aspects (e.g., one's relative 
tax burden) have been treated as representative indicators of generic concepts such 
as 'fiscal fairness' (see De Juan et al., 1994). Other research has looked at single 
justice issues in more depth, but in isolation. Although some authors have 
demanded that attention be 'directed toward what forms of inequity are likely to 
affect tax evasion behavior' (Spicer and Becker, 1980, p. 174) and 'that one has to 
specify fairly carefully what one means by the inequity or injustice that is often 
cited as a motive for evading taxes' (Cowell, 1992, p. 540), so far these questions 
have not been systematically addressed. 
The most common differentiation in research on tax compliance refers to the 
concepts of exchange equity, vertical equity and horizontal equity (e.g., Kinsey and 
Grasmick, 1993). Exchange equity concerns the perceived value of tax-funded 
government benefits and services received relative to one's tax contribution. 
Vertical equity concerns the burden of taxes for certain social strata relative to 
other strata. Horizontal equity concerns the burden of taxes for members relative to 
others within a given social stratum. Other studies have focussed on the structure 
of tax rates (e.g., Roberts, Hite and Bradley, 1994) or on procedural fairness in 
audits (e.g., Stalans and Lind, 1997). A few studies have tried to specify 
empirically the dimensionality of the fairness concept. Based on factor analysis, 
Gerbing (1988, cited in Roberts and Hite, 1994) found four dimensions of tax 
fairness, namely general fairness and distribution of tax burden, exchange with 
government, taxes of the wealthy and progressivity of tax rates. Christensen, 
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Weihrich and Newman (1994) also used factor analysis and found five factors: 
personal payment level, exchange with government, tax rate structure, special 
provisions and overall fairness. 
However, outcomes of factor analyses depend on the measures fed into the 
analyses; the dimensionality of a concept cannot be decided on purely empirical 
grounds. We require a theoretical framework that guides the formulation of 
measures and that aids us in systematically investigating the role of fairness for 
taxpaying attitudes and behaviour. Such a framework should also help us integrate 
diverse research findings, point to areas that have been neglected so far and 
identify areas where the evidence is either inconsistent or conclusive. In the 
following, I will suggest a taxonomy for this purpose and review the literature on 
this basis. 
Three Areas of Justice 
In social psychology it has become common practice to differentiate between three 
areas of justice (Tyler and Smith, 1998). Distributive justice refers to the fairness 
of the outcomes of a resource allocation or distribution and has the longest research 
tradition in social psychology (Romans, 1961; Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid 
and Walster, 1973). At its core lies the concept of entitlement or deservingness; 
that is, a situation is considered just when a given social unit receives the amount 
or share of resources it is perceived to deserve (Lerner, 1991; Major, 1994; 
Feather, 1999; Wenzel, 2000). 1 Resources may be understood here in a wide sense 
and include material and non-material, positive and negative resources (e.g., tax 
burden). Distributive justice thus refers to a perceiver's view of how to distribute a 
given pool of resources so that a certain target, or all social units involved, receive 
what they are entitled to (proactive); and it refers to the post-decisional perception 
of whether a target, or all social units, have received what they are entitled to 
(reactive) (Greenberg, 1982). The reactive version, furthermore, includes 
attributions of responsibility and blame when entitlements are perceived not to be 
met (Mikula, 1993). 
Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the processes of a resource 
allocation or distribution. While distributive justice concerns decision outcomes, 
procedural justice pertains to the ways, modes and procedures of reaching the 
decision (Thibaut and Walker, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Lind and Tyler, 1988). 
Although not yet established practice, the entitlement concept may also be applied 
to the procedural arena (Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas and Weinblatt, 1999; Wenzel, 
2000). An allocation decision will be regarded as procedurally fair when a certain 
target, or all social units involved, are perceived to be granted the treatment, role 
and quality of decision-making they are entitled to. It is inherent to the concept that 
entitlements are not constant but relative and variable in that they involve social 
comparisons and context effects. Perceptions of procedural justice would therefore 
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be understood as equally variable and context-dependent. Indeed, Barrett-Howard 
and Tyler (1986) found that the importance of Leventhal's (1980) six rules of 
procedural justice - consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, 
representativeness and ethicality - varied between different situations. However, 
compared to the distributive arena, researchers often regard variability and context-
dependence of criteria to be less intrinsic to the procedural justice concept. Given 
the empirical invariance of criteria between different ethnic groups, Tyler, 
Boeckmann, Smith and Huo (1997) argue that procedural justice has the potential 
to bridge across norm and value conflicts (e.g., conflicts due to differing notions of 
distributive justice). 
Retributive justice refers to the fairness of sanctions and reactions to the 
breaking of social rules and norms (Hogan and Emler, 1981; Miller and Vidmar, 
1981; Tyler et al., 1997). Retributive justice is distinct from distributive and 
procedural justice because, as Tyler and Smith (1998) argue, if a norm of 
distributive justice has been violated, that norm would only demand the restitution 
of the just situation (as the norm defines it). In fact, however, people may not only 
demand restitution but also punishment of the actor, going beyond the distributive 
norm and requiring a further category of justice principles for its justification. 
Again, a concept of entitlement or deservingness can be considered to be at the 
core of retributive justice (the term 'entitlement' is of course awkward for negative 
outcomes). The central question of retributive justice is what treatment and degree 
of sanction the rule-breaker deserves. Deservingness of punishment should depend 
on the perceived importance of the violated rule, the severity of rule violation and 
the degree of responsibility and blame attributed to the actor (Miller and Vidmar, 
1981; Weiner, 1995). 
It is beyond the focus of the present chapter to further discuss and review the 
research on these three areas in the abstract. As I will argue below, all three aspects 
of justice play a role in the realm of taxation and it will be shown that taxpayers' 
perceptions of each justice aspect could impact on their level of tax compliance. 
Three Analytic Levels of Justice 
As argued earlier, the expected utility approach to tax compliance is limited in its 
assumption that taxpayers try to maximise the absolute utility or favourability of 
outcomes rather than also being concerned about their fairness and 
appropriateness. Moreover, the approach focuses on the individual's outcomes 
alone and does not acknowledge potential concerns for outcomes of certain societal 
groups with which taxpayers may identify, or outcomes of the society at large. 
Justice and fairness perceptions at an individual, group and societal level might 
impact on tax compliance. To clarify this differentiation, I will distinguish it from 
the related concepts of micro and macro-justice as suggested by Brickman, Folger, 
Goode and Schul (1981) (see Tyler eta!., 1997; Tyler and Smith, 1998). 
Wenzel, M. 2002. Tax compliance and the psychology of justice: mapping the field. 
In: Taxing democracy. Braithwaite, V. (ed.) Farnham, Ashgate. Used by permission of the publishers. 
Available at http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754622437
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice 47 
At an individual level, people can be concerned about the justice and fairness of 
their individual outcomes and treatment. The perceived recipient unit (Eckhoff, 
1974) of the outcome allocation is the individual; and people want a certain target 
individual (normally themselves) to be treated in a way they feel they are entitled 
to. This seems close to what Brickman et al. (1981) define as microjustice; that is, 
individuating principles prescribing that individuals be treated according to an 
assessment of their individual attributes (e.g., merits, efforts, needs). However, 
individuals' entitlements can also be based on what Brickman et al. (1981) define 
as principles of macrojustice; that is, deindividuating principles that do not 
consider individual attributes as a basis for resource distributions and rather 
prescribe properties of the distributions themselves. For instance, a macro-principle 
could prescribe a flat distribution (e.g., a flat tax rate), implying that each social 
unit should receive an equal share (or burden) regardless of their individual 
differences (i.e., the equality principle). So, independent of the nature of the 
principles applied, it is essential for individual level justice that the perceiver 
regards the individual as the recipient unit and evaluates the degree to which the 
entitlements of a certain target individual are met (e.g., one's own entitlements). 
At a group level of analysis, people can be concerned about the justice and 
fairness of a group's outcomes and treatment. The group is regarded as the 
recipient unit and people want a certain target group (in most cases the group they 
identify with, i.e., their ingroup) to be treated in a way they feel the group is 
entitled to. Again, these entitlements can be based on micro-principles that 
prescribe a treatment based on an assessment of relevant attributes of the target 
group relative to other groups. Alternatively, the group's entitlement can be based 
on macro-principles that prescribe certain features of the distribution as a whole. 
For instance, a macro-principle could specify the maximum burden (e.g., tax rate) 
any group should have to bear, implying that a certain target group (e.g., high-
income earners) is entitled to carry a burden no higher than the specified 
maximum. 
Thus, it is essential to the group-level analysis that groups, rather than 
individuals, are the recipient units whose entitlements are to be judged, on the basis 
of intergroup rather than interpersonal comparisons (Markovsky, 1985; Major, 
1994). In research on relative deprivation, we find a related distinction between 
personal and group relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; see Kessler, 
Mummendey and Leisse, 2000). Note that even in cases where single persons 
receive certain resources (e.g., a job), they might be considered as members of 
social groups rather than individuals; and they might receive these resources based 
on perceived entitlements of their group rather than individual entitlements (e.g., in 
affirmative action programs). Hence, the level of abstraction of the recipient unit is 
a function of social categorisation (Smith, Spears and Oyen, 1994 ), which in turn is 
an act of social construction and sense-making rather than objective criteria 
(Oakes, 1996). Also, the level of abstraction of the recipient unit can vary beyond a 
simple dichotomy of individuals versus groups; it can vary on a continuum of 
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inclusiveness (e.g., individual, carpenter, trades people, employees, taxpayers) (see 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty, 1994). 
At a societal level, people can be concerned about outcomes, their general level 
or the form of their distribution, of the society at large (see Wenzel, 2000, 200la, 
2002). Either individuals or groups can be the recipient unit of the distribution; 
however, people would want the collective of all individuals or groups to be treated 
in a way they consider fair or appropriate. That means, the societal level of 
analysis deals most directly with Brickman et al.'s (1981) concept ofmacrojustice. 
Different from the previous two levels of analysis, macrojustice principles are not 
merely applied to evaluate the outcomes of a target person or group; rather, the 
overall realisation of these principles is evaluated across all individuals or groups, 
across all potential recipients. 
Following this discussion, the present taxonomy distinguishes between an 
individual, group and societal level of analysis and applies these to the three areas 
of justice, namely distributive, procedural and retributive justice. Instead of doing 
this in the abstract, however, I will refer to research on the relation between justice 
and tax compliance to illustrate the taxonomy and, conversely, use the taxonomy to 
systematically review relevant research. 
Justice and Tax Compliance 
Justice aspect (distributive, procedural, retributive) and level of analysis 
(individual, group, societal) are considered here as two dimensions of a taxonomy 
used to differentiate research and findings on the role of justice in tax compliance. 
Note that I do not suggest that this (or any other) taxonomy in itself provides us 
with a theoretical understanding of the relationship between justice and 
compliance. We might have better glasses to see the world, but that does not 
replace efforts to comprehend what we see, namely by applying, testing and 
developing substantial theoretical propositions about underlying processes (e.g., 
Tyler, 2000; Wenzel, 2001b). 
Distributive Justice and Tax Compliance 
Similar to the priority that social psychology has historically given to distributive 
justice (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973; Leventhal, 1976; Lerner, 1977), tax 
compliance research has so far mainly focussed on distributive aspects of taxation. 
It has done so on all three levels of analysis, as defined above, however without 
differentiating them explicitly in most cases. Some research has used measures that 
did not specify the level of analysis and so these cases cannot be categorised 
unambiguously into the present schema (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Distributive justice in taxation: examples for three levels of analysis 
Individual level Group level Societal level 
Tax burdens personal tax burden; ingroup's tax burden; tax level; distribution; 
compared to others; compared to other progressivity 
other times; one's groups; other times; its 
relative income relative income 
Tax-based personal benefits ingroup's benefits; level of spending; 
benefits compared to others; compared to other efficiency; distribution 
other times; one's groups, other times; its over different policies 
relative taxes relative taxes 
Avoidance/ personal options ingroup's options level; distribution of 
evasion compared to others; relative to other opportunities 
opportunities other times groups 
Two issues of taxation have commonly been considered in terms of distributive 
fairness, namely (a) tax burdens and (b) tax-funded benefits or government 
services. Another 'resource' distributed among taxpayers are (c) opportunities to 
avoid (or evade) tax. The latter issue also involves elements of procedural justice 
(and retributive justice) but is considered here primarily as a distributive justice 
issue, because such opportunities can affect one's actual tax burden. In fact, one 
might argue that this issue could be subsumed under (a). However, having 
opportunities to avoid or evade taxes does not mean that one actually uses them to 
reduce the tax burden; and yet, the distribution of opportunities itself could be 
evaluated in terms offairness. Hence, the issues will be dealt with separately. 
At an individual level, taxpayers might evaluate the distributive fairness of their 
personal tax burden, share in tax-funded benefits or avoidance opportunities. They 
may evaluate their tax burden compared to other taxpayers; in particular those 
taxpayers they would consider equivalent and comparable in terms of their 
economic circumstances. This would be a case of horizontal justice. Dean, Keenan 
and Kenney (1980) found in a survey with taxpayers in Scotland that perception of 
horizontal injustice were very prevalent, with 26 per cent of taxpayers believing 
they paid 'far too much' relative to other taxpayers of the same income level. Other 
studies investigated the impact of such perceptions on tax evasion. In an 
experimental simulation study, Spicer and Becker (1980) manipulated people's 
relative tax burden. Participants' tax burden was portrayed as either lower, equal or 
higher than others. They found that disadvantageous inequity increased tax evasion 
and advantageous inequity decreased tax evasion. However, Webley, Robben and 
Morris (1988) used a similar manipulation for relative tax-free allowances and did 
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not find an effect on tax evasion. Again using a similar manipulation (but with only 
two levels, i.e., horizontal equity and unfavourable inequity), Moser, Evans and 
Kim (1995) also failed to find a main effect of horizontal justice on the amount of 
income correctly reported (however, they found an interaction effect with 
exchange equity; see below). 
Taxpayers may also refer to other comparison referents when evaluating the 
fairness of their tax burden. For instance, they could compare their current tax level 
with their earlier tax burdens (Calderwood and Webley, 1992). Wartick (1994) 
investigated effects of tax law changes and found that the changes were considered 
more unfair when participants felt they made them worse off (however, the effect 
was moderated by whether or not justifications for the changes were provided; see 
below). Furthermore, individuals could also compare their tax burden with others 
who are in a different economic situation than they are and evaluate their own and 
others' tax rates relative to their income levels (i.e., considering income levels as 
inputs, according to the equity calculus) (Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978). 
Similarly, taxpayers could be concerned about the fairness of their share in tax-
based benefits. They could evaluate their benefits relative to their tax burden, the 
benefits of others (either in absolute terms or relative to their different tax burdens) 
or the benefits they enjoyed at an earlier time? These issues have been studied 
under the label 'exchange equity', although only a comparison of benefits relative 
to taxes paid would be a strict case of exchange equity (Vogel, 1974; Spicer and 
Lundstedt, 1976). Wallschutzky (1984) surveyed a group of convicted tax evaders 
and a control group in Australia and found no difference in their evaluations of 
income tax relative to government services. In an interview study in Oregon, 
Mason and Calvin (1978) asked taxpayers to evaluate their tax levels compared to 
the benefits they received, and the amount of their benefits compared to the 
benefits of the average person in the state. Neither rating was related to self-
reported evasion. However, Porcano (1988) applied very similar measures in a 
survey with American taxpayers. He combined the two questions into one score 
and found that self-reported evaders perceived the exchange as more unfair than 
non-evaders did. In an experimental study, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) 
manipulated the magnitude of returns relative to the taxes paid and found that 
compliance increased with the favourability of that ratio (note that the 
manipulation applied to the whole group and can also be interpreted as affecting 
the exchange relationship at a 'societal' level; see below). Finally, Moser et al. 
(1995) found that exchange equity (manipulated via different tax rates while the 
amount of tax-funded benefits was constant, namely nil) interacted with horizontal 
inequity and affected the correct reporting of income only when one's tax rate was 
higher than others' tax rate. 
Taxpayers may also evaluate the fairness of their opportunities to avoid or 
evade tax, again compared to others' minimisation or evasion options or one's own 
options at different times. However, most studies that investigated perceived 
opportunities to avoid or evade tax dealt with their absolute level but not their 
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perceived fairness (Vogel, 1974; Wallschutzky, 1984; Porcano, 1988). In fact, 
when fairness of avoidance opportunities was addressed, it was usually done at a 
group level of analysis (see below). This is not surprising, because, minimisation 
opportunities are given in the structure of the law, specifying circumstances that 
apply to groups of taxpayers (rather than individuals). Moreover, differences 
between taxpayers in terms of their resources to employ tax minimisation 
strategies, and strategists, define salient groups in the context of taxation (e.g., the 
rich versus the poor). 
At a group level, taxpayers may evaluate the fairness of the same three issues -
tax burden, tax-funded benefits and avoidance/evasion opportunities - for their 
group (or any group). They could evaluate these outcomes again relative to other 
social referents (i.e., groups), temporal (i.e., former times) or counterfactual 
referents (i.e., an imagined world). However, only a small amount of published 
research applied such a group level analysis, despite Schmolders' (1970) early 
contention that 'success of an income tax depends on cooperation; this means not 
so much on individual but group cooperation' (p. 305). Kinsey and Grasmick 
(1993) found that American taxpayers' belief that the tax system (after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986) benefited the rich had a significant effect on respondents' 
expressed acceptability of tax cheating. Recall also that Gerbing (1988) found 
attitudes towards taxes of the wealthy as a factor of fairness in taxation. This was 
also one of the aspects Roberts (1994) addressed in his televised appeal messages 
that successfully affected perceptions of fairness and attitudes to non-compliance. 
Admittedly, such group level issues are at times difficult to distinguish from 
research applying a societal level of analysis (see the concept of vertical justice 
below). 
Further evidence for the role of group level injustice for tax evasion comes 
from some qualitative data concerning avoidance/evasion opportunities. Spicer and 
Lundstedt ( 197 6) report that 7 5 per cent of those who found the distribution of tax 
burdens unfair stated as the major reason the 'extensive tax avoidance by affluent 
taxpayers and corporations' (p. 301). Likewise, in Wallschutzky's (1984) survey, 
respondents in both the group of convicted evaders and the control group 
'expressed grave concern [about] the lack of opportunity for wage and salary 
earners to evade tax [with] the consequent shift of the weight of tax burdens' 
(p. 381). Conversely, it could be that more affluent people, who pay a higher tax 
rate but are less likely to be recipients oftax-funded welfare benefits, feel that their 
exchange relationship with the government is unfair when compared to lower 
income groups (Vogel, 1974). 
At a societal level, taxpayers could evaluate whether the tax system yields good 
and fair distributions of tax burdens, tax-funded benefits or minimisation/evasion 
opportunities. They could do so in comparison with other societies, different times 
and counterfactual systems - generally on the basis of an idea of how their society 
should look. Concerning tax burdens, people could evaluate various parameters of 
their distribution; for instance, the level of taxes for different societal groups, the 
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degree of progressivity of tax rates, the taxable income threshold or the maximum 
tax rate. Or, they could evaluate the degree to which the tax system overall realises, 
or deviates from, a good distribution of tax burdens. Porcano ( 1988) used a rather 
global measure of such an evaluation, asking whether the current tax system treats 
everyone fairly and whether certain types of taxpayers (based on income) received 
favourable treatment. Aggregated into one scale, the measure did not account for 
differences in hypothetical or self-reported evasion. 
A more sophisticated method was used by Kinsey and Grasmick (1993), who 
asked respondents to rate the fairness of tax burdens (on a scale from less to more 
than their fair share) for four categories of taxpayers representing lower versus 
upper income strata. For each respondent they calculated the standard deviation 
across the four ratings, as a measure of how strongly his/her fairness ratings varied 
between the different groups. Note that this measure would yield a low score even 
if all tax burdens were considered as unfair but deviating in the same direction 
from fairness. This would be the case, for instance, if tax burdens were generally 
considered too high. Hence, the mean level of ratings across groups could be used 
as an additional societal level fairness measure of the level of tax burden or the 
government-taxpayer exchange relationship (Kinsey et al., 1991). The standard 
deviation measure, in contrast, is a measure of discrepancies between different 
groups or, as used by Kinsey and Grasmick (1993), between different economic 
strata, and is thus a measure of vertical injustice. In Kinsey and Grasmick's (1993) 
third study, the measure significantly contributed to the prediction of future 
intentions to cheat on taxes. 
Fairness of the tax rate structure and its degree of progressivity is another 
aspect of vertical justice. With a regressive tax rate, taxes are less than proportional 
to income (even though people with higher income may pay higher taxes); with a 
flat tax rate, taxes paid are strictly proportional to income; and with a progressive 
tax rate, taxes are more than proportional to income. Preferences for a more or less 
progressive tax structure may be based on views about the relative benefits from 
tax-funded services for low and high-income earners, the belief that those able to 
pay more should pay more tax or some notion that the disutility of tax sacrifices 
varies with income (see Musgrave, 1994). The concept of progressivity is, 
however, a complex one and respondents often misunderstand it (Sheffrin, 1994), 
which is why results are often inconsistent (e.g. results depend on how abstractly 
or concretely the questions are put) (Roberts et al., 1994 ). While various studies 
have investigated taxpayers' preferences concerning a more or less progressive tax 
structure (e.g., Lewis, 1978; Porcano, 1984; Hite and Roberts, 1991; Copeland and 
Harmelink, 1995), few studies have shown how these preferences, or their 
perceived frustrations, are related to taxpaying attitudes and tax compliance. 
Roberts and Hite (1994) distinguished between three groups of participants who 
found a flat rate, a mildly progressive rate and a steeply progressive rate most fair, 
respectively. Respondents tending towards a flat rate evaluated the overall tax 
system as more unfair, while the level of compliance in terms of underreporting of 
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cash income did not differentiate between the groups. For all groups, attitudes 
about current tax rates were related to the perceived overall fairness of the tax 
system. Interestingly, however, overall fairness ratings of respondents who 
preferred progressive rates were also influenced by their concerns about the 
existence ofloopholes for the wealthy. 
Thus, preference for progressive tax rates can partly be a response to a 
perceived societal level unfairness of a different kind, namely the unfair 
distribution of avoidance and evasion opportunities. As reported earlier, Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976) and Wallschutzky (1984) also found evidence for the view that 
taxpayers are very concerned about inequities with regard to minimisation and 
evasion options (see Song and Yarbrough, 1978). In his televised appeal 
campaigns, Roberts (1994) addressed both the reduction in tax shelter activity and 
the decrease of opportunities for tax evasion (next to other issues). The campaigns 
proved effective in increasing fairness ratings and compliance attitudes. However, 
more controlled research would be needed on the impact of this societal level 
justice perception before any firm conclusions could be drawn. 
Finally, taxpayers can also evaluate the fairness of the taxpayer-government 
exchange relationship at a societal level. As noted earlier, the fairness of the 
general level of taxes can be seen as part of the societal level exchange equity. 
Kinsey et al.' s ( 1991) measure of mean fairness across groups offers one possible 
operationalisation of this construct. More specifically, however, this fairness aspect 
would concern the satisfaction with the government's use of revenue. Revenue use 
could be evaluated in terms of the perceived general level and efficiency of 
spending as well as the distribution of revenue across different policies, portfolios 
and taxpayer groups. Wallschutzky (1984) did not find a significant difference 
between convicted evaders and a control group with regard to their overall 
satisfaction with government spending (satisfaction was generally low). In a study 
referred to earlier at the individual level, Alm et al. (1992) manipulated the 
efficiency of revenue use and, correspondingly, the relative level of benefits in 
return for taxes paid. They varied the level of benefits as a multiple of taxes paid 
by the collective (multiplying tax revenue by 0, 2 and 6, respectively); hence, a 
societal-level interpretation may be appropriate. Indeed, compliance increased with 
efficiency of provision of social goods. In another simulation study, Alm, Jackson 
and McKee (1993) manipulated the favourability of the 'policy' on which revenue 
would be spent (when the choice for one out of two options was imposed on them). 
Compliance was significantly lower when the revenue was supposed to be spent on 
the less favoured public good. Interestingly, the study indicated a clear social 
dimension of the effect of public good preference. Namely, in two other conditions 
participants decided per majority rule on the use of the tax revenue and were given 
feedback about the vote outcome. When the vote was clearly in favour of one 
option (rather than an unattractive alternative), compliance was significantly higher 
than when the vote showed a narrow preference for the same option with an 
attractive alternative. This finding suggests that when the preference for a public 
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good to be funded by tax was socially shared, tax compliance was increased. 
Moreover, the research showed that compliance was higher when revenue use was 
decided on by majority vote rather than imposed; this, however, leads us to a 
different area of justice. 
Procedural Justice and Tax Compliance 
Compared to distributive justice, procedural justice has received considerably less 
research attention in the area of taxation, but undeservedly so. Four issues of 
procedural justice are distinguished here: (a) the quality oftreatment in interactions 
between taxpayers and tax authorities, (b) the degree to which taxpayers have a say 
(voice and control), (c) the extent and quality of information provided by tax 
authorities, and (d) compliance and administration costs. The last issue also has a 
distributive justice dimension, as compliance costs can mean a material burden on 
taxpayers and administration costs can imply a waste of revenue. However, 
because inappropriate procedures are the cause of the problem, and there are other 
possible effects apart from material losses, the issue is dealt with here as a 
procedural one. Again, all these issues can be analysed at an individual, group and 
societal level (see Table 3.2). 
At an individual level, taxpayers could evaluate how fairly the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) treats them personally (or any other target individual, such 
as a family member or friend) in terms of respectfulness, neutrality and 
trustworthiness (see Tyler, 1989, 1997). Following Tyler's (1990) work, Smith and 
Stalans (1991) regard respectful and responsive treatment as a 'positive incentive' 
that could increase taxpaying attitudes and behaviour through strengthening the 
allegiance to tax authorities. Smith (1992) indeed found a measure of taxpayers' 
perceived fairness of the tax authority (consisting of items tapping respect and 
trustworthiness) to be negatively related to perceived acceptability of non-
compliance (i.e., cash under reporting). Stalans and Lind (1997) interviewed 
taxpayers, or their representatives, after being audited by the ATO. Respondents 
who mentioned in their open-format evaluations that they had been treated 
respectfully rated the auditor as procedurally fairer than those who did not mention 
respectful treatment. Likewise, perceived neutrality of the auditors' decision-
making was related to perceived fairness. However, the study did not include any 
findings on whether or not perceived fairness had any implications for compliance 
attitudes or behaviour. 
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Table 3.2 Procedural justice in taxation: examples for three levels of analysis 
Individual level Group level Societal level 
Interactional respect for the respect for the rights for taxpayers 
treatment individual; ingroup; consistency and service standards 
consistency relative relative to other 
to other individuals groups 
Process and voice; control; voice; control; consultation of 
decision consultation of consultation and taxpayers in general; 
control individual representation of democratic structures 
in group 
Information explanations and explanations and transparency; 
and justifications for justifications for presentation in media 
explanation decisions affecting decisions affecting the 
the individual in group 
Compliance efficiency; service efficiency; service vs. administration and 
costs vs. costs for the costs for the ingroup compliance costs; 
individual complexity of the tax 
system 
Taxpayers can also evaluate the amount of voice or control they have in 
decision processes; that is, the degree of consultation and representation in tax 
matters. In their study on audits, Stalans and Lind ( 1997) found that taxpayers who 
mentioned that auditors were unresponsive to their views and comments thought 
auditors tried less hard to be fair. Alm et al.'s (1993) finding falls in the same 
category of fairness effects. As mentioned earlier, participants who could decide 
over the use of tax revenue by vote and majority rule, rather than the spending 
purpose being imposed on them, were more compliant (see Tyler, Rasinski and 
Spodick, 1985). 
Another potential subject of fairness evaluations is the extent and quality of 
information provided by the ATO. While access to and provision of information 
may also impact on compliance costs (see below), they are first of all understood 
here in their intrinsic value of providing transparency, justifications and 
explanations for decisions (informational justice) (Greenberg, 1993). Magner, 
Johnson, Sobery and Welker (2000) found that perceived attempts to justify a 
revenue spending decision did not contribute uniquely, that is, beyond the effects 
of other fairness criteria, to perceived procedural justice. However, Wartick's 
(1994) research, referred to earlier, showed that the provision of explanations for a 
tax law change can increase perceptions of fairness. However, the outcomes of her 
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two studies were inconsistent in that the justification effect occurred either only for 
those less well off due to the change (study 1) or only for those unaffected by the 
change (study 2). As Wartick argues, the results might reflect the fact that the 
justification needs to be found adequate in order to be effective (Greenberg, 1993). 
Moreover, procedural justice was defined earlier as implying a concept of 
entitlement. Hence, it could be argued that taxpayers would regard a certain 
treatment as particularly fair when it satisfies their perceived entitlements. In a 
study with a student sample in Australia, I asked respondents to rate their 
perceptions of and response to a reminder letter that they hypothetically received 
from the ATO (Wenzel, 2001 c). The letter either contained respectful treatment 
(interpersonal justice), provided explanations and justifications (informational 
justice), or was a usual, rather concise, letter from the ATO (control). Furthermore, 
each letter highlighted one of three rights from the Taxpayers' Charter (Australian 
Taxation Office, 1997), namely, rights to respectful treatment, explanation of 
decisions, or minimisation of costs (control). In line with the prediction, the 
interpersonal justice letter was considered fairer than the other two letters, when 
the interpersonal right (respect) was salient. The informational justice letter was 
considered fairer than the other two letters when the information right 
(explanation) was salient. Feelings of entitlement seem to play a role for 
perceptions of procedural fairness. The results suggest that tax authorities could 
indeed profit from alerting attention to and granting taxpayer rights, but they would 
need to assure that the rights are indeed fulfilled. 
Finally, individuals may also be concerned about the efficiency of their 
interactions with the ATO or, conversely, the costs of their attempts to be 
compliant. Possible issues could be the promptness of correspondence, provision of 
assistance and clear instructions, waiting time on the phone and length of queues at 
information desks (see Smith and Stalans, 1991). For instance, in Stalans and 
Lind's (1997) study, respondents' satisfaction with their audit treatment was 
affected by the perceived time the auditor used to gather information and make a 
decision. Likewise, respondents were more dissatisfied, the longer it objectively 
took to reach a decision. Wallschutzky (1984) found that convicted evaders were 
less satisfied than the control group with the efficiency and speed of the A TO's 
handling of their tax returns. 
The same issues of procedural justice could be analysed at a group level, which 
research has so far neglected. For instance, taxpayers could feel they are treated 
disrespectfully as members of a certain group (rather than as individuals) (see 
Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 2002a). They could believe that the ATO is not neutral 
and treats their group differently from another group (see Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 
2002b ). Likewise, they could feel that the ATO allows voice, and listens, to certain 
societal groups rather than others. They could think that the ATO goes to great 
lengths to explain decisions to, and try to receive consent from, some groups but 
not when it comes to their group. Or, they could believe that their dealings with the 
ATO are less efficient and the costs of complying with the laws are higher for their 
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group than for others. A good example of this latter issue is the strong 
dissatisfaction small business owners expressed after the introduction of Tax 
Reform in Australia in 2000. With the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), and the (initial) requirement to lodge quarterly tax statements, they felt 
small business was carrying the greatest burden of the tax changes. They also felt 
disadvantaged compared to larger business who were in a better position to make 
one-off investments in structural changes to cope with the new system. 
At a societal level, the same four issues and how they apply to the ATO's 
treatment of all taxpayers could be of concern. For instance, the A TO's formal 
granting of respective rights and service standards could be seen as a measure of 
procedural fairness at a societal level. Based on a survey with Australian citizens, 
Braithwaite and Reinhart (2000) found that respondents had greater trust in, and 
more favourable attitudes towards, the ATO when they believed that the ATO met 
their obligations set out in the Taxpayers' Charter. The Australian Taxpayers' 
Charter not only grants fair and respectful treatment and confidentiality, but also 
makes explicit taxpayers' options for making complaints and appealing decisions. 
The latter would be an instance of voice and process control at a societal level. 
Perceptions of large-scale voice and control about taxation issues, however, are 
also based on views about the presence of participatory and democratic political 
structures (as simulated in the study by Alm et al., 1993 or referred to in the 
vignette study by Tyler et al., 1985). The third issue of informational justice is 
played out at the societal level in terms of the ATO' s transparency towards the 
public, its presentation in the media and the extent of communication with 
taxpayers. 
Overall, these societal-level issues have rarely been investigated in their 
potential impact on tax compliance. In contrast, the fourth issue, namely the 
efficiency or costliness of the tax system, has attracted quite a lot of research 
attention. This issue has been dealt with in particular under the labels of 
administration and compliance costs (e.g., Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989) 
and the complexity of the tax system (e.g., Milliron, 1985). Both topics are related 
(e.g., Blumenthal, 2000), but only the latter has been discussed explicitly in 
relation to perceptions of fairness, with authors disagreeing about how, or whether 
at all, complexity is related to fairness) (see Carnes and Cuccia, 1996). According 
to Carnes and Cuccia (1996), complexity overall is negatively related to perceived 
equity; however, taxpayers can regard specific complexities as justified and thus 
these would contribute less to perceptions of unfairness. Yet, Smith asked 
respondents to rate the probable effectiveness of eight possible 'ways that might 
help the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] do a better job' (1992, p. 237). 
Respondents most strongly recommended a simplification of the tax system; and 
the more unfair they thought the current tax system was, the more they 
recommended simplification. It may be added here that respondents' second 
strongest recommendation was to increase the likelihood of tax offenders being 
caught. This leads us to the third area of justice. 
Wenzel, M. 2002. Tax compliance and the psychology of justice: mapping the field. 
In: Taxing democracy. Braithwaite, V. (ed.) Farnham, Ashgate. Used by permission of the publishers. 
Available at http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754622437
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
58 Taxing Democracy 
Retributive Justice and Tax Compliance 
Issues of retributive justice have rarely been explicitly studied in the context of tax 
compliance. Findings like Smith's (1992), however, suggest that they deserve our 
attention, as the results seem to indicate that honest taxpayers (i.e., presumably the 
majority of taxpayers) are concerned about others betraying the system and getting 
away with it. In fact, however, questions of retributive justice have two 
perspectives. First, as just stated, honest taxpayers could perceive it as unfair, and 
consider their sense of responsibility to be disrespected or ridiculed, when they see 
others violate the law, disregard civic duties, make their profit and go unpunished. 
Second, taxpayers who violate tax laws could find the penalty they receive unfair, 
disproportional to the offence, or for other reasons unjustified. In its narrow sense, 
retributive justice deals here with the question of fair and appropriate punishment 
for tax evaders. In a wider sense, this could also include the appropriateness of 
procedures involved in investigating tax evasion. Thus, there is some overlap with 
the category of procedural justice, where we already discussed research on fairness 
in the context of audits. 
As with distributive and procedural justice, issues of retributive justice could be 
relevant at three different levels of analysis (see Table 3.3). 















penalty for ingroup 




audit for ingroup cases 
Societal level 
severity of penalties; 
distribution penalties 
for different offences; 
quality of penalties 
rigidity or 
inconsiderateness of 
audits in general 
Taxpayers could question the fairness of the treatment that they (or another target 
individual) receive as a response to a suspected or established act of tax evasion. 
They could find a penalty too severe (or not severe enough) relative to the offence, 
given the degree of blame attributed to oneself (or the other person) or compared to 
other cases. They could find the audit process too rigid, ignorant of possible harm 
to the person or their business, or a mere harassment. At a group level, the same 
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issues could be considered for the treatment of one's own group relative to other 
groups. At a societal level, some possible issues could be the perceived fairness of 
the general severity of penalties for tax offences, the relative severity of penalties 
for small versus serious offences (i.e., a version of vertical justice), or the 
perceived quality of the punishments such as their punitive versus reintegrative 
character (see Braithwaite, 1989). 
As stated above, there is not much research available on these issues. Vogel 
(197 4) asked participants to select appropriate penalties (no penalty, fine, 
imprisonment) for acts of tax evasion differing in seriousness. However, he 
compared the responses with the penalties suggested for other offences, but not 
with the perceived actual penalties for tax evasion. Thus, the questions were used 
as an indirect measure of people's attitudes towards tax evasion as an offence 
compared to other offences (see Song and Yarbrough, 1978), but not people's 
perceived fairness of the current system of penalties for tax evasion. There is, 
however, much anecdotal evidence for taxpayers' resentment over incidences 
where individuals defied the ATO, evaded or avoided tax, and yet escaped 
prosecution. In fact, the resentment is often better understood as an intergroup 
phenomenon in that certain groups of people (e.g., the rich, big business) are 
considered to be able to dodge their taxpaying responsibilities and the ATO is 
perceived as being soft on 'them' (see Shover, Job and Carroll, Chapter 8, this 
volume; Braithwaite, Chapter 12, this volume). 
Likewise, researchers have argued that taxpayers subject to investigation or 
punishment could resent their treatment, find penalties unfair or audits 
unreasonably intrusive, and as a consequence develop more negative attitudes 
towards the ATO (Striimpel, 1969; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Sheffrin and 
Triest, 1992; Murphy, 2002a, 2002b). At a group level, taxpayers could also 
question the consistency of the ATO's enforcement procedures and penalty 
regimes across different societal groups. For instance, in the 1990s, tax 
miminisation schemes gained popularity, and were strongly promoted, among 
groups of middle and working-class Australians (see Murphy and Byng, 2002). 
While the A TO tolerated the practices for several years, in early 1998 it decided to 
crack down on the schemes, declared them illegal and amended previous tax 
assessments. Taxpayers involved in the schemes faced large tax bills, penalties and 
interest charges (Murphy, 2002a, 2002b). There was not merely a perceived 
inconsistency over time; more crucially people resented the decision because they 
thought it reflected discriminatory treatment of them, the normal middle or 
working-class people, versus the rich who always go unpunished. As one tax 
scheme promoter put it: 'You see, it was OK while it was the top end of town, but 
when it was the mums and dads of Australia starting to take advantage of the same 
tax breaks, then, of course, it was time to call a halt' (Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, Four Corners, 2001) (see also Senate Economics References 
Committee, 2001; Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 2002a, 2002b, for work on perceptions 
of ATO fairness by scheme investors). 
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Issues of retributive justice may also play a role in the success or failure of tax 
amnesties (Hasseldine, 1998); however, tax amnesties have been analysed so far 
mainly from an economic expected utility perspective (e.g., Almand Beck, 1990; 
Stella, 1991 ). Under these programs, previously non-compliant taxpayers are asked 
to come forward and disclose their tax deficiencies, normally with the incentive of 
penalties being waived before a certain deadline. The aims of such measures are 
twofold: to get hold of revenue that would otherwise be lost because detection of 
the evasion would be either unlikely or costly, and to bring taxpayers who dropped 
out of the system back into the system. Taxpayers who previously evaded tax but 
have changed their attitude would no longer feel forced to repeat their previous 
behaviour out of fear of receiving high penalties. They might therefore view the 
amnesty as a way of giving them a fair chance. In contrast, taxpayers who are 
already honest may consider a tax amnesty unfair, because it does not acknowledge 
their integrity, disadvantages them materially and rewards tax evasion (Hasseldine, 
1998). The perceived unfairness of tax amnesties, in addition to their potential 
impact on expected utilities from evasion behaviour, may undermine tax morality 
in the long run. 
Conclusion 
The evidence for the role of justice perceptions for tax compliance, as reviewed in 
the previous sections, supports my introductory argument that a pure self-interest 
account is insufficient for a proper understanding of taxpaying behaviour. 
Furthermore, the review demonstrates the complexity of questions of fairness in 
the area of taxation and supports my view that we need to differentiate more 
precisely the aspects of justice we are talking about. The distinction between 
distributive, procedural and retributive justice is an established one in 
psychological research on justice (Tyler and Smith, 1998). As shown, all three 
areas seem to be potentially relevant to the phenomenon of tax compliance. 
Likewise, the distinction between different levels of analysis, even though often 
overlooked, is considered valuable in psychological research on justice (Tyler and 
Smith, 1998). To some extent, this distinction was already implicit in the fairness 
concepts applied to tax compliance (e.g., horizontal versus vertical justice), but an 
explicit and systematic application of different levels of analysis proved possible 
and instructive. In particular, an intermediate group level analysis has been largely 
neglected in tax compliance research, whereas studies on justice and relative 
deprivation have demonstrated the distinctive dynamics when people do not 
consider themselves as individuals but rather as members of social groups (e.g., 
Smith et al., 1994; Platow, O'Connell, Shave and Hanning, 1995; Wenzel, 2002). 
An analysis of tax non-compliance as a group level response that is based on an 
interpretation of the situation shared within one's relevant ingroup, and that is 
justified as a response against the perceived unfair treatment of one's ingroup 
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(relative to other groups), is more than plausible. Unfortunately, however, there is 
limited research that speaks directly to such an account. 
Indeed, the main value of the present review is less likely to consist in its 
statement about what we know about the role of justice perceptions for tax 
compliance, but rather what we do not know. For several issues, the review 
revealed inconsistent findings that could not be resolved here, because a more 
thorough analysis of the different methodologies and operationalisations would be 
required. More importantly, however, the argument is that we cannot expect all 
findings to be consistent as they refer to various forms of fairness perceptions. The 
taxonomy suggests which results should be comparable and therefore which 
inconsistencies need to be resolved. Moreover, the review showed that a number of 
issues identified on the basis of the present taxonomy have rarely been investigated 
at all. Specifically, questions of retributive justice at all three levels of analysis 
have been largely ignored. Likewise, only a few studies have looked at the role of 
procedural justice for tax compliance. Further, even in the area of distributive 
justice, which has been the main focus of research, a group level analysis has been 
clearly neglected so far. Future research needs to address these issues. 
Future research would also need to test for independent and unique effects of 
the various justice considerations, as they are likely to be empirically correlated 
with each other. Research could try to establish which of the more finely 
differentiated justice considerations are most strongly related to, and most 
predictive of, tax compliance (Wenzel, 2001 d). The results could be valuable for 
tax legislators and tax authorities, not only by providing a more differentiated 
diagnosis of the underlying problem, but also by suggesting priorities for 
addressing the issues. 
However, contextual conditions should furthermore moderate the impact of the 
various justice concerns on taxpaying behaviour. We need to apply and develop 
more refined theoretical accounts for the relevance of justice concerns. Empirical 
inconsistencies revealed in the present chapter, where consistency was expected, 
may be partly due to methodological differences between the studies; however, 
they also encourage us to look for moderating factors and gain a better 
understanding of when and why people are concerned about fairness at all. 
In a recent study on tax compliance (Wenzel, 2001 b), I tested the prediction 
that concerns for procedural and distributive justice would depend on the level of 
identification with the inclusive category (i.e., one's nation) within which 
procedures were applied and resources distributed (Tyler, 1997; Tyler and Smith, 
1999; Wenzel, 2000, 2001a, 2002). Based on a survey with Australian citizens 
(Braithwaite, 2001), the results confirmed the predictions for two forms of tax 
compliance (i.e., under reporting of non-pay income, exaggerations of deductions). 
Self-interest variables were more influential when respondents were less identified 
as Australians, while perceptions of procedural and distributive justice were more 
positively related to compliance when respondents identified strongly as 
Australians. Two other forms of compliance were not related to fairness concerns 
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but to self-interest considerations. These two forms, namely cash under reporting 
and tax minimisation, could be considered more legitimate behaviours, at least for 
certain reference groups, and might therefore constitute rational choices rather than 
a protest against perceived injustices. Thus, not only could social identity influence 
whether or not people are concerned about justice, but qualities of the specific 
behaviours could moderate whether or not these would be used as a response to 
perceived unfairness. 
Certainly, further research in this direction is necessary. The present chapter 
was not meant to offer substantial theoretical propositions about underlying 
psychological processes. Rather, it provides a map to the field, using a larger scale 
and covering familiar and unfamiliar territory that will hopefully act as a tool for 
future expeditions. 
Notes 
I will not distinguish here between entitlement and deservingness, but see Feather (1999) 
and Steil (1994). 
2 In fact, they could also compare their share in tax-funded benefits with their share at 
future times or under counterfactual conditions; for instance, when the opposition party 
suggests a different use of tax revenue (see Folger, 1986). 
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